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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
manner of excuses to remove a case from the docket. Judges deserve sympathy
for the excessive amount of work to which they have been subjected, however, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that allowing a judge to be persuaded of his court's unsuitability less by the circumstances of the case than
by his own overcrowded calendar would be a suitable remedy or a correct
solution. 4 Under the revised Judicial Code " it would seem to be the intent
of the Congress to limit the remedy to transfer only, there being no other
indication in the Code of allowing dismissal of action, or refusal to exercise
jurisdiction where other requirements therefor are met. It would seem to
be a rather serious matter for a federal court to refuse jurisdiction to a
litigant with an unadjudicated cause which is definitely within the statutory
authority of the court. The right, or privilege, to litigate is not something
which the court may grant or withhold simply for the sake of its convenience.

FEDERAL TAXATION-DEDUCTIBILITY

OF ATTORNEY'S

FEES IN CONTESTING GIFT TAX DEFICIENCY DETERMINATION
Petitioner made gifts of stock. Commissioner of Internal Revenue notified him of a deficiency in his gift tax return. A redetermination of liability was
filed and an out of court settlement was reached. In filing his income tax
return petitioner deducted attorney fees expended in defending said assessment. Commissioner refused deduction. On appeal, held, that said deduction
was allowable under § 23(a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code I as constituting expenses "... for the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property held for the production of income." 2 Lykes v. Commissioner,
84 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
Prior to 1944 one could deduct from gross income only those expenses
incurred in the operation of a trade or business.' Since that time, Congress
34. Forum Non Conveniens, a New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J 1234, 1247
(1947). See Justice Clark's dissent in Hammett v. Warner Bros., 176 F2d 145,
152 (2d Cir. 1949). 1 0

35. 28 U.S.C. § 4 4(a) (1948). "For convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." The Reviser in his note
on this section states that it was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is
proper and cites Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) as an example of
the need of such a provision.
1. 56 STAT. 819, 26 U.S.C. § 23(a) (2) (1942). "Deductions from gross income. In
computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: . . . (2) non-trade or nonbusiness expenses. In the case of an individual, all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year for the production or collection of income, or for
the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income."
2. The court found Treasury Regulation 111 § 29.23(a)-lS(b) as amended by T.D.
5513 in conflict with the Internal Revenue Code and therefore invalid.
3. Williams v. Burnett, 59 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (expenses incurred in prosecution of claim for compensation against city property condemned by city were not deduct-

CASES NOTED
has liberalized the allowances for such expenses with the enactment of
§ 23(a)(2). 4 Interpreting this statute the court held that attorney's fees resulting from litigation involving income-producing property were deductible
only when directly connected with or proximately resulting from taxpayer's
business.8 However, the holding in Bingham v. Commissioner6 reversed this
trend toward strict application and liberally construed the section so as to
widen the scope of allowable deductions thereunder. In the Bingham case,
fees paid an attorney by trustees for attacking an income tax deficiency
judgment were deductible expenses incurred in the management of property,
even though not a trade or business expense.
Cases involving the deductibility of attorney's fees uniformly followed
the doctrine of the Bingham case 7 until the holding in Cobb v. Commissioner.8 In the latter case, it was held that attorney's fees paid by petitioner
for advice and services rendered in a controversy concerning the amount of
petitioner's liability for gift taxes were not deductible. The plaintiff contended that expenses incurred in defending a tax assessment were related
to the conservation of income-producing property because judgment against
him would result in a lien upon said property. The court rejected this contention holding it was not sufficiently related to conservation to be a deductible
expense. The Bingham case was distinguished ' on the ground that under the
terms of the trust instrument involved, the trustees had a legal obligation to
distribute the property to the heirs, and consequently, the expense was
related to the management of that property. But in the Cobb case, the court
held that since the transfer was voluntary it was not related to the conservation of property.
ible from income tax); Hall v. Helvering, 70 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (fees paid by

decedent's devisees to attorney for services in collecting estate tax were not deductible) ;
Crawley v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1937) (expenditure made for purpose of
acquiring property or gaining control of business-not deductible).
4. See Haggens v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 654 (1st Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
868 (1944) (reference to taxes on property held for production of income were deductible) ; Heller v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1944) (court held deductible at-

torney's fees paid in litigating the cash value of certain shares of stock); Commack v.
Commissioner, 5 T.C. 467 (1945)

(Plaintiff bought stock to produce income. Stock be-

came worthless and Plaintiff deducted cost from income for that year. Legal fees incurred in that tax litigation were deductible) ; Tyler v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 135 (1946)
[attorney's fee paid in connection with a will contest which determined amount of annual
income payable to Plaintiff as a life tenant was held deductible under § 23 (a) (2)].

S, Spear v. Gane, 49 F. Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1943) (allowances for services of guardians,
commissions paid, attorney's fees, and court fees wetre deductible) ; Edmunds v. United

States, 71 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (attorney fees paid by taxpayer for recovery of
principle sum overpaid on estate of taxpayer's dead mother were not deductible); cf.
Helvering v. Stormfeltz, 142 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1944) (ward sued guardians for recovery
of embezzled funds. Attorney's fees were deductible for that portion of legal expenses al-

locable to recovery of interest, but not to that part pertaining to recovery of capital).
6. 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
7. E.g., Stoddard v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1945); Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945); Dunitz v. Commissioner, 167 F2d 223 (6th Cir.
1948).

8. 173 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1949).
9. 325 U.S. 365, 367 (1945).
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The instant case refutes the distinction between the Bingham and Cobb
cases, stating that the former had correctly stated the law when it held that
expenses must be proximately related to the conservation of property. It
holds that if a lien upon any of petitioner's income-producing property would
result from a tax assessment, attorney's fees paid out in defending such
a claim are proximately related to the conservation of income-producing
property and, consequently, are deductible under § 23(a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.
To logically follow this reasoning would be to conclude that the expense of defending any type of litigation, for example, a tort action, would
be deductible because a judgment rendered against taxpayer would become
a lien on his income-producing property.' 0 However, the law is still clear
that where the transaction which gave rise to the tax assessment was not
proximately related to the production or collection of income, any expense
arising from such litigation would not be deductible." The Lykes case does
not change this rule. It merely broadens the scope of expenses considered
proximately related to include attorney's fees paid for defending a tax
assessment where the assessment might result in a lien on any of petitioner's
income-producing property, even though such property was not the subject
of the transaction which gave rise to the original tax assessment.

INSURANCE-SUBROGATION-REQUIREMENT TO
DEFEND-ATTORNEY'S FEES IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Plaintiff, insurance company, brought suit for a declaratory judgment
against its insured under a public liability policy to determine whether it was
required to defend an action against the insured by a third party. Judgment
was rendered for the insured and attorney's fees were adjudged against insurer
under a Florida statute ' which provides that attorney's fees be assessed against
insurer where insured successfully prosecutes suit against the company. On
appeal, held, that attorney's fees were properly awarded insured since the statute is applicable to situations where suit is brought by insurer as well as insured,
Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson's Groves, Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir.
1949).
Where attorney's fees are permitted by statute, cases arising thereunder
10. See John W. Willmot, 2 T.C. 321, 326 (1943).
11. Kohnstamm v. Pedrick, 66 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Joseph v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 583 (1947).

1. FLA. STAT. § 625.08 (1941). "Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any

of the courts of this state against any insurer in favor of the beneficiary under any policy
or contract of insurance executed by such insurer, there shall be adjudged or decreed

against such insurer and in favor of the beneficiary named in said policy or contract of
insurance, a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for his attorneys or solicitors prose-

cuting the suit in which recovery is had."

